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NORMATIVE G A P S  I N  T H E  C R I M I N A L  LAW: 
A R E A S O N S  THEORY O F  WRONGDOING 
Luis Ernesto Chiesa Aponte* 
In this article it is argued that in two controversial homicide cases-severing 
conjoined twins and downing a hijacked commercial plane headed toward a 
heavily populated area-it is permissible to kill innocent human beings with- 
out having to establish the existence of a claim ofjustijcation such as self- 
defense or choice of evils. Even though criminal law scholars consider that 
unjustified conduct is always wron&l, the position defended in the article is 
that there is a normativegap between an absence ofjustijkation and a find- 
,> ing of wrongdoing. This 'hormative gap defense, which negates wrongdoing 
without justzfjing the conduct, is the best way to deal with the troubling 
homicide cases described above. The normative gap defense is g-rounded on 
what is called a "reasons" theory of wrongdoing. According to this theory, the 
state cannot legitimately prohibit conduct when, in light o f  the fact that there 
are pow+l utilitarian reasons in favor of performing the act and com- 
manding deontological reasons against performing it, we are in a state of 
equipoise in which it is impossible for us to determine which course of action 
is '?he right thing to do" (i.e., justified). Under these circumstances, the con- 
duct should be regarded as non-wron&l even though it is unjustifed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NORMATIVE GAP THESIS  
Can the willful and premeditated killing of an innocent human being ever 
be considered lawful? That was precisely the question the English Court 
of Appeal had to answer several years ago in one of the most interesting 
criminal law cases in recent memory: the conjoined twins case.' There, a 
doctor asked for a court order that would authorize him to perform an 
operation to separate two conjoined twins. The doctor was aware that the 
weakest of the twins, Mary, would die as a result of the operation. 
However, by performing the operation the life of the strongest twin, Jodie, 
could be saved. If the twins remained conjoined, they both would surely 
die within the next six months. If the doctor performed the operation and 
Mary died, would he be guilty of criminal homicide? The Court of Appeal 
answered "no" and, therefore, authorized the severance of the twins.' Is 
there a principled way to account for this solution? 
Now, consider a second case. Suppose that Pat and Jamie, a couple of 
American terrorists, hijack a commercial plane en route to New York City 
on Labor Day. The plane is carrying two hundred passengers. The hijackers 
set a course for the plane that leads it on a collision course with the Empire 
State Building. Military officials in Washington are immediately alerted of 
the imminent threat. Afier much deliberation they decide to shoot down 
the plane in order to avert the hijacker's attack. They are aware that by 
shooting down the plane they will kill the innocent passengers on board. 
Additionally, the officials know that when the plane crashes it will inevitably 
kill close to one hundred innocent people occupying the space where the 
plane is expected to crash. The  officials shoot down the plane with a mid- 
range missile. The Empire State building and the lives of the people inside 
are spared, but only at the cost of the two hundred souls inside the plane 
and the one hundred innocent people on the ground where the plane 
crashed. Is there a principled way of concluding that the military officials 
should not be punished for shooting down the plane and killing the inno- 
cent passengers on board and the innocent people on the ground? 
My intuitions tell me that both the doctor in the conjoined twins case 
and the officials in the hijacked plane hypothetical should not be punished 
I .  Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation), [zoo51 4 All ER Ca 961. 
2. Id. at 1018. 
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for their killing of innocent human beings. Therefore, if I were a judge in 
these cases I would conclude that both actors should be acquitted and 
then struggle to find the rationale for writing the opinion. Generally, if a 
person is not punished it is because his conduct falls into one of the fol- 
lowing categories: (I) it does not satisfi the paradigm (i.e.; definition) of 
an offense; (2) it is justified; or (3) it is exc~sed .~  In this article, however, I 
will argue that none of the above mentioned categories can be used to 
explain coherently why the doctor and the officials should not be pun- 
ished. Consequently, I will attempt to flesh out a fourth category that can 
adequately explain why both these actors should escape from punishment. 
The core question underlying these cases and every other criminal case 
is whether punishment and condemnation are justifiable under the cir- 
cumstances. Recognizing this elementary proposition requires us to focus 
on the logical nature of punishment. My thesis is that in much the same 
manner as awarding compensation doesn't make sense if there are no dam- 
ages, imposing punishment is incoherent in the absence of certain logical 
prerequisites. Among them is the fact that the defendant engaged in a 
wrongful act. 
Consequently, in this article I will attempt to elucidate both the rela- 
tionship of wrongdoing to punishment and the very meaning of wrong- 
doing. In the end, I will try to show two things: (I) that the reason why 
the doctor and the officials should not be punished is because their con- 
duct is not wrongful, and (2) that none of the three traditional categories 
can satisfactorily explain why their conduct is not wrongful. 
The first section of the article briefly examines why punishment doesn't 
make sense without wrongdoing. I will try to prove this by positing the 
question, "what is punishment imposed for?" Following a variation of a 
Hegelian theory of punishment, I will contend that the logically com- 
pelled answer to this query is that punishment is imposed for wrongdoing. 
3. These categories represent the traditional approach to criminal law defenses both in 
the common law and continental tradition. In Anglo-America see, for example, Paul H.  
Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 11-14 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson, 
Structure]. In Europe see, e.g., Enrique Bacigalupo, Lineamientos de la Teoria del Delito 
43 (3rd ed. 1994). There is an additional category that explains why some conduct, even- 
though unjustified and unexcused, can be exempt from punishment. Professor Paul 
Robinson calls this category "non-exculpatory defenses." z Paul H. Robinson, Criminal 
Law Defenses 460 (1984) [hereinafter r Robinson, Defenses]. Non-exculpatory defenses 
are not of importance for che purposes of this article. 
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In addition to this I will show that the connection between culpability and 
punishment is not one of logical necessity but of justice. Therefore, the 
primary inquiry should turn to determining whether the doctor's and the 
official's conduct was or was not wrongful. 
The second section analyzes the possible meanings of wrongdoing. The 
inquiry will follow two stages. In the first stage I will explore the relation- 
ship between the elements of an offense, justificatory defenses, and 
wrongdoing. I will conclude that an unjustified infraction of the elements 
of an offense points strongly in the direction of wrongdoing without con- 
clusively establishing it. In the second stage I will examine two competing 
approaches to wrongdoing. The first approach, which I call the negative 
approach to wrongdoing, holds that wrongful conduct consists of an 
unjustified infraction of the elements of an offense. This negative 
approach is defended by most, if not all, of the criminal law scholars both 
in the common law and the continental tradition. Nonetheless, I will 
defend a second approach, which I will call the positive approach to 
wrongdoing. Under this approach, wrongdoing is not exhausted by a 
showing of an unjustified infraction of the elements of the offense. In sev- 
eral instances, something else needs to be proved in order to conclusively 
establish wrongdoing. The positive approach holds that there is a norma- 
tive gap between an absence of justification and a finding of wrongdoing. 
Ultimately, I will attempt to show the superiority of the positive to the 
negative approach by demonstrating that the only approach that can 
coherently establish the non-wrongful nature of the doctor's and the offi- 
cial's conduct is the positive one. In other words, I believe that the correct 
solution to the conjoined twins case and the hijacked plane hypothetical 
lies in concluding that both actors conducted themselves in a manner that, 
although unjustified, is not wrongful. 
The third and last section constitutes a search for a principle that can 
explain the gap between an absence of justification and wrongdoing The 
principle can be found if one adheres to what I call a reasons theory of 
wrongdoing. According to this theory, conduct is wrongful if, and only if, 
the reasons against performing the conduct exceed the reasons in favor of 
performing the conduct. On the other hand, conduct is not wrongful, 
because justified, if the reasons in favor of performing the conduct out- 
weigh the reasons against performing it. Finally, I will propose that conduct 
is not wrongful, although unjustified, when it is impossible for society to 
determine whether the reasons in favor of performing the conduct outweigh 
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the reasons against performing it because there are powerful conflicting 
reasons both in favor and against doing so. 
In the cases that I posited at the beginning of this article, it can be said 
that both the doctor and the officials have strong utilitarian reasons for 
engaging in the conduct (saving as many lives as possible). Contrarily, the 
state has commanding deontological reasons for prohibiting the conduct 
(respecting the inviolability of innocent human life). Different people in 
society accept these conflicting reasons for action as moral principles that 
determine the way that they live their lives. Therefore, it is not possible to 
determine whether the utilitarian reasons in favor of performing the con- 
duct outweigh the deontological reasons against performing it. According 
to the reasons theory of wrongdoing, the fact that it is impossible for society 
to choose between these conflicting reasons for action appears as a sufficient 
basis for not prohibiting the conduct even though it does not provide a 
proper foundation for justifying the act. 
II. WHAT I S  PUNISHMENT IMPOSED FOR? 
Scholars have long debated the issue of what is the proper aim of punish- 
ment.4 However, there is an even more fundamental question that remains 
under theorized: what is punishment imposed for?5 In this section I will 
try to give an answer to that question. The analysis will proceed in two 
steps. First of all, I will attempt to clarifjr the difference between asking 
" 
what is punishment imposed for?" and "what is the aim of punishment?" 
Next, I will explain that punishment is imposed for the commission of an 
offense by elucidating how and why the concept of punishment is neces- 
sarily connected to the actual or perceived commission of an offense. I 
cannot cease to stress the importance of the fact that the connection 
between wrongdoing and punishment is conceptual. In this sense, pun- 
ishment would simply not make sense without wrongdoing. This will lead 
me to argue that the relevant inquiry in both the conjoined twins case and 
4. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 401 (1958). 
5. Two Anglo-American scholars have actually paid attention to this query: H.L.A. Hart 
& George I? Fletcher. See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968); George I? 
Fletcher, What Is Punishment Imposed For?, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 101 (1994). 
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the hijacked plane hypothetical is ascertaining whether the doctor and the 
officials have committed an "offense" that would make the imposition of 
punishment coherent. 
A. Two Different Questions 
Every single theorist, whether he defends a consequentialist or a deonto- 
logical approach to punishment, expresses his view on the subject of pun- 
ishment and its aims in the following manner: "Punishment is imposed 
for with the aim of ." For some reason that I still do not 
understand, these two questions are often confused. In other words, every 
writer implicitly must take a stand on two very distinct questions: (I) What 
is punishment imposed for? and (2) What is the aim of punishment? 
Myriad examples can be given in favor of this contention. Hegel, for 
example, believed that punishment is imposedfor an action that objectively 
contradicts the Right with the aim of reasserting the Right over the wrong 
implicated by such an a ~ t i o n . ~  For Kant punishment is imposedfor a 
criminal action with the aim of doing j ~ s t i c e . ~  A famous nineteenth- 
century German criminal law scholar, Anselm von Feuerbach, believed 
that punishment is imposedfor an act manifesting disobedience to societal 
norms with the aim of malung citizens comply with the norms out of fear 
of being punished if they do not.' For the famous turn-of-the-century 
Italian scholar Enrico Ferri, punishment is imposedfor an act demonstrating 
the moral inferiority of a person's character with the aim o f  rehabilitating 
the ~ f f e n d e r . ~  The same can be said of Anglo-American scholars. Duff, for 
example, believes that punishment is imposedfor conduct that has wronged 
members of a moral community with the aim of establishing a dialogue 
between the wrongdoer and the community.1° For Fletcher punishment is 
imposedfor a wrongful and culpable act with the aim of expressing solidarity 
with the victim." 
6. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right 69 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942). 
7. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 141 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991). 
8. Santiago Mir Puig, Derecho Penal: Parte General 91 (7th ed. 2004). 
9. Alejandro Alagia, Alejandro Slokar, & Eugenio Raul Zaffaroni, Derecho Penal: Parte 
General 57 (2nd ed. 2002). 
10. R.A. Du& Penal Communications: Recent Works in the Philosophy of Punishment, 
20 Crime &Just. i (M. Tonry ed., 1996). 
11. George I? Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 37-38 (1998). 
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The linguistic difference between asking "what is punishment imposed 
for?" and "what is the aim of punishment?" is readily apparent in the 
Spanish language. It plays on the subtle difference between the Spanish 
prepositions "por" and "para." Usually, the preposition "po i  is used to sig- 
nify a past state of affairs while the preposition "para" is used to signify an 
aim that has yet to be achieved." An example illustrates this point. If a 
child who has just been scolded by his mother were to ask her, "$or qut 
me regafias?" (what am I being scolded for?) she could answer, "por 
haberme gitado" (for yelling at me). O n  the other hand, if the child were 
to ask her, "para qut me regafias?" (why are you scolding me?) she could 
answer, "para que no lo vuelvas a hacer" (so that you don't do it again). 
However inconspicuous it might seem, the interplay between the 
prepositions "por" and "para" ultimately determine the meaning of the 
child's two questions and, therefore, the form the mother will give to her 
answers. For, in Spanish, "por" is usually used when one wishes to inquire 
about the causation of events while "para" is usually used when one wish- 
es to inquire about the motivation of the actor. When the child asks, "ipor 
qut  me regafias?" (what are you scolding me for?) he seeks a causal expla- 
nation that links his mother's action (scolding) to an event that triggered 
it (yelling at his mom). Contrarily, when the child asks, ''<para qut me 
regafias?" (why are you scolding me?) he seeks not a causal explanation of 
the event but rather a motivation explaining his mother's reaction. "Por" 
inquires about the event that caused the scolding while "para" inquires 
about the aim the mother had in scolding him. One can now see why it 
is different saying that "la pena se impone poi' (punishment is imposed 
for) than saying "la pena se impone para" (punishment is imposed to). 
While the latter question seeks a causal explanation that points towards 
the event that triggered the imposition of punishment, the former query 
is driven by a desire to discover the aim that motivates the imposition of 
punishment. The first question should be answered by ascertaining that 
" la pena se impone por la violaci6n antijuridica de una norma" (punishment 
is imposedfor the wrongful violation of a norm). The second question, on 
12. See, for example, the different uses of the word "por" and "para" in a Spanish dic- 
tionary. "Porn can be used to inquire into the causation of events while "para" can be used 
to inquire into the aims or purposes of our actions. These differing functions of both 
prepositions are not interchangeable. z Real Academia Espafiola, Diccionario de la Lengua 
Espafiola 1674, 1803-04 (22 ed. 2001). 
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the other hand, should be answered by ascertaining that "la pena se 
impone para disuadir a futuros ofensores" (punishment is imposed to deter 
future offenders--or any other legitimate aim of punishment). In sum, 
"por," in this context, is backwards looking while "para" is forwards look- 
ing. The same thing should hold in English. The phrase "punishment is 
imposedfor'' looks towards an event in the past while the phrase "punish- 
ment is imposed to" looks towards a goal that is to be achieved in the 
future. 
As can clearly be seen through both examples of scholarly opinion on 
the subject of punishment and through an inquest into the differences 
between the Spanish propositions of "por" and "para," the inquiry 
inevitably turns to the search for an answer to two distinct questions that 
should not be confused: what is punishment imposed for? ("ipor q u t  se 
impone la pena?), and what are the purposes of punishment? (ipara qu t  se 
impone la pena?). What I find more interesting, however, is the fact that 
while many of these writers substantially diverge on their views concern- 
ing the aims of punishment," all of them agree on their views regarding 
the event that triggers the imposition of punishment: punishment is 
imposed for the commission of an act that represents an untoward state of 
affairs. In other words, punishment is imposed for the commission of an 
offense. This is altogether clear in H.L.A. Hart's conception of punishment 
since he stresses that one of the constitutive features of punishment is that 
it must be triggered by "an offense against legal r ~ l e s . " ' ~  
This apparent consensus regarding the answer to the question of "what 
is punishment imposed for?" reveals a deep conceptual connection 
between the offense and the p~n i shmen t . ' ~  This connection highlights the 
13. Hegel, Duff, and Fletcher are retributivists albeit for different reasons (Hegel focused 
on the abstract "reassertion of the Right" while Duff stresses a "communicative" account 
of retribution and Fletcher views it as a way of reestablishing equality between victim and 
offender). Contrarily, Feuerbach and Ferri are consequentialists (Feuerbach believed that 
general deterrence is the aim of punishment while Ferri believed char special deterrence was 
the aim of punishment). 
14. Hart, supra note 5, at 4-5. 
15. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 35. This definitional or conceptual connection between 
punishment and the past commission of an offense is also apparent in the works of Leo 
Zaibert. See, for example, Leo Zaibert, Punishments, Institutions and Justifications, 30 
Stud L. Pol. & Soc'y 51, 53 (2003) (stating that "[p]unishment, by definition, is an act car- 
ried out in response to something else. . . ." (emphasis added)). 
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centrality of the concept of "wrongdoing" in explaining the true nature of 
punishment in so far as it entails inflicting pain upon a for having 
committed an offense and not justfor the sake of social protection.I6 This 
logical or conceptual connection between offense and punishment reveals 
that imposing punishment without the commission of an offense would 
be akin to the state's production of random and arbitrary violence. 
Ultimately, every time an actor is threatened with the imposition of 
punishment the threshold inquiry must be to ascertain whether or not the 
actor committed a wrongful act "for which" punishment is to be imposed. 
Consequently, the relevant inquiry in both the conjoined twins case and 
the hijacked plane hypothetical is to determine whether the doctor's and 
the officials' conduct constitutes an "offense" that triggers the imposition 
of punishment. 
6. About the Meaning of 'Offense" 
I would like to briefly explain what an offense is in this context and elu- 
cidate how and why the concept of punishment is necessarily connected 
to the commission of an offense. 
When someone commits an offense he is either implicitly or explicitly 
calling into question the efficacy of a norm,I7 because the communicative 
aspect of his act demonstrates that the offender is unwilling or unable to 
abide by the rules that a given society deems to be necessary in order for 
its citizens to organize their lives in an adequate manner. In turn, this call- 
ing into question of the efficacy of the norm has the effect of frustrating 
the expectation of law-abiding citizens that such norms will be observed.'' 
Punishment represents the reaction to this frustrated expectation.19 
Consequently, the act of punishment serves to reestablish the efficacy of 
the norm after it has been called into question by the commission of an 
offense. In this manner, the expectation that law-abiding citizens have 
16. Fletcher, supra note 11. Of course, this should not be read to mean that punishment 
cannot serve the purpose of social protection. See, e.g., Francisco Mufioz Conde & 
Mercedes Garcia Arb,  Derecho Penal: Parte General 50-51 (6th ed. 2004). 
17. Giinther Jakobs, Imputation in the Criminal Law and the Conditions for Norm 
Validity, 7 BuK Crim. L. Rev. 491, 495 (2004). 
18. Id. at 496. 
19. MuAoz Conde & Garcia Arb,  supra note 16, at 35. 
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regarding the observance of norms is reinforced by the imposition of pun- 
ishment upon those who shattered that expectation with the commission 
of an offense. 
Notice that an actor violates the norm even if he is excused. Therefore, 
his conduct calls into question the efficacy of such a norm and could, in 
principle, trigger the imposition of punishment in order to reassert the 
efficacy of the infringed norm. Suppose, for example, that Allan, a 
deranged lunatic, kills Bill believing him to be the devil. Allan's conduct 
clearly violates the norm against homicide. That is why the language 
found in modern formulations of the insanity defense presupposes the 
violation of the norm when it requires the actor not to be aware of the 
"wron&Lness of his act."20 In other words, in order to establish a valid 
claim of insaniry the actor must concede that his conduct was wrongful 
(i.e., violated the norm). Therefore, societal expectations that norms will 
be followed are still disturbed by Bill's conduct. Punishment can be coher- 
ently imposed for his norm violation in an attempt to reinforce the socie- 
tal expectations that were shattered by Bill's wrongful conduct. Therefore, 
if we decide not to punish Bill based on the excuse of insanity we are 
somehow asserting that, even though punishing him for his norm violation 
would be perfectly coherent, we believe that it would be unjust to do so. 
Consequently, under my theory, it seems clear that the connection between 
punishment and wrongdoing is one of logical necessity and not of jus- 
t i ~ e . ~ '  That is why punishing insane Bill would be coherent even if it 
would be utterly unjust to do so. It would be coherent to punish Bill for 
20. See, for example, the Model Penal Code's the formulation of the insanity defense. 
Model Penal Code $4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (actor not responsible if he lacks 
capacity to appreciate the criminality or wrongfirlness of his act). An actor who alleges the 
excuse of mistake of law also implicitly admits that his conduct violated the norm (i.e., is 
"wrongful"). His defense rests on his admittedly mistaken perception that the norm was 
not violated. It is more difficult to see why someone who establishes a claim of duress or 
excusable necessity (i.e., "personal necessity) implicitly admits the violation of the norm. 
Maybe the fact that an actor may exert self-defense against someone acting under duress 
or excusable necessity indirectly supposes that the norm was violated since self-defense can 
only be exerted against a "wrongful" aggression. I'm gateful to Professor George P. Fletcher 
for pointing this out. 
21. Fletcher, however, could be read in a way that could lend support to a different 
proposition. Namely, that punishment is imposed for a culpable and wrongll norm viola- 
tion and not merely for a wrongful one. In his words: "[p]unishment is imposed, therefore, 
for wrongdoing as reduced by the extent to which culpability is diminished." Fletcher, supra 
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his wrongdoing in the sense that doing so would not appear to be an act 
of random brutality. 
This can be summarily restated in the following fashion: 
(I) The commission of an offense calls into question the efficacy of 
a norm. 
(2)  This calling into question of the efficacy of the norm frustrates 
the expectations that law-abiding citizens have that such norms 
will be observed. 
(3) Punishment reasserts the efficacy of the norm infringed by rein- 
forcing the expectations that law-abiding citizens have regarding 
the observance of norms. 
(4) When an actor is excused society chooses, out of compassion for 
the actor, not to punish the offender even though punishing 
him would be coherent (though unjust) because his conduct 
called into question the efficacy of the norm by violating it. 
The relationship between punishment, offense, and norms now 
becomes apparent. By violating the norm the offender cails into question 
its efficacy and it is by virtue of punishing the offender for his violation 
that the efficacy of the norm is reestablished. In other words, punishment 
is the reaction to an act of wrongdoing (i.e., violation of a norm) that has 
the effect of reasserting the efficacy of the norm that was infringed by the 
wrongful act. This position is compatible with the core views held by 
desert theorists since in order to deserve punishment one must have com- 
mitted a wrongful act. However, contrary to the views shared by most 
desert theorists, I believe that punishing an excused offender is perfectly 
coherent even though it might be blatantly unjust. 
It is now clear that what needs to be ascertained in assessing whether 
the doctor and the officials should be punished for their conduct is 
whether their conduct constitutes an offense. In a deeper sense what needs 
to be assessed is whether their conduct was wrongful (i.e., violated a norm) 
note 5, at 109 If his view were that punishment is imposed both for a wrongful and cul- 
pable act I would have to disagree. As I have attempted to show, conceptually speaking, 
punishment is imposedfor wrongdoing and nothing more. The relationship between cul- 
pability and punishment is not a matter of conceptual necessity but of justice. However, I 
find it unclear from his writings whether he actually supports this view or the one I defend 
in this Article. See Fletcher, supra note 5 ,  at 105 (stating that punishment "is imposed for 
the act of wrongdoing"). 
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and, therefore, whether it should be interpreted as a calling into question 
of the efficacy of the norm. This necessarily requires an elucidation of the 
concept of wrongdoing because, as I have tried to show, an understanding 
of the meaning of punishment can only be achieved by an understanding 
of the meaning of crime (i.e., of offense, wrongdoing, or norm violation). 
Nozick summed this up in a simple yet illuminating formula that ade- 
quately explains the relationship between wrongdoing and p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  
According to his formula, punishment is the product of the amount of 
wrongdoing times the degree of responsibility (on a scale of o to I). 
Algebraically stated, Nozick's formula looks like this: P = W x R.23 Notice 
the centrality of the concept of wrongdoing in this formula. Punishment 
is imposedfor wrongdoing. Without wrongdoing it would not even make 
sense to talk about the "responsibility" of the actor since one would be left 
asking oneself "responsibility for what?" This helps to explain why, in 
absence of wronghl conduct, punishment would become an arbitrary 
decision. Culpability only determines the amount of punshment to be 
imposed. The less culpability the offender exhibited while performing the 
wrongful act the less punishment he deserves. 
In sum, determining whether or not the doctor's and the officials' con- 
duct was wrongful is of the utmost importance because punishing them 
would only be coherent if it is in reaction to the wrongful violation of a 
norm whose efficacy is thus called into question. 
Ill. THE MEANING OF WRONGDOING- 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARADIGMz4 
OF AN OFFENSE, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES, 
AND WRONGDOING 
I have tried to show that punishment can only be imposed for wrongdo- 
ing. That is, no punishment can be coherently imposed when there is no 
wrongdoing no matter what theory ofpunishment one espouses. Therefore, 
22. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 363 (1981); see also Fletcher, supra note 5 ,  
at 109. 
23. Where P equals "punishmentn, W equals "wrongdoing" and R equals "responsibility". 
zq. The term "paradigm" is used as a translation for the German "tatbestand" and the 
Spanish "tipo." Roughly speaking, the "paradigm" of an offense is equivalent to the "definition 
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I now turn to the fundamental inquiry ofwhether or not the doctor's and 
the officials' action was wrongful. In assessing whether the doctor's (had 
he performed the operation without asking for judicial authorization) 
and the military officials' actions were wrongful, one must necessarily 
evaluate two distinct aspects of their conduct: (I) did it satisfy the para- 
digm of the offense of homicide? and (2) was it justified under any con- 
ventionally recognized justificatory claim such as self-defense, necessity, 
or public duty? 
A. The Paradigm and Wrongdoing 
Killing someone intentionally is the normal or paradigmatic case of a pun- 
ishable murder. Likewise, damaging the property of another is a paradig- 
matic or typical case of punishable criminal mischief. For every instance 
of what we regard to be traditional crimes there are hypothetical cases that 
portray what we take to be the usual or paradigmatic cases of punishable 
commission of such offenses. The above-mentioned examples represent 
such hypothetical cases. Namely, in normal or paradigmatic cases, those 
who intentionally kill someone are liable for murder and those that dam- 
age the property of another are liable for criminal mischief. Of  course, 
someone who intentionally kills another can escape liability for murder by 
proving that the killing took place in self-defense. Similarly, someone who 
damages the property of another might avoid liability by establishing that 
his act was necessary in order to avoid a greater evil or harm or by prov- 
ing that he was insane at the time he performed the wrongful action. 
These hypothetical cases, therefore, represent watered down descriptions 
of the crime. They represent only the inculpatory facet of the offense with- 
out regard to possible claims of justification or excuse. However, these 
examples constitute a useful tool with which to explain to someone the 
essence or core of the punishable crime of murder or criminal mischief. 
(or elements) of an offense." However, "paradigmn should be preferred over "definition" 
because it illuminates the fact that conduct infringing the elements of an offense is a nor- 
mal or paradigmatic case of wrongful conduct. Of  course, one may prove that this instance 
of "normally" wrongful conduct is, exceptionally, not wrongful. See Albin Eser, 
Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime, in I Justification and 
Excuse: Comparative Perspectives 17, 37 (George I? Fletcher & Albin Eser eds., 1987). 
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Most people refer to this core aspect of the crime as the "elements of the 
~ffense."'~ Fletcher has suggested that we use the term "Definition" (of the 
~ffense).~"n Spanish, we use the word "tipo" as a means of implying that 
the violation of the elements of the offense represents the typical case of a 
punishable crime.27 This is why I propose that we use the term "paradigm" 
to capture the typical or normal case of punishable offenses. The  paradigm 
of the offense describes the standard or paradigmatical instances of  
punishable crimes. 
O f  course, since the paradigm of the offense represents a watered down 
version of the offense, its mere infraction does not necessarily entail that 
the conduct is wronghl or punishable. In cases of justification, for exam- 
ple, conduct infringing the paradigm of the offense is considered non- 
wrongful. By the same token, in cases of excuse, conduct infringing the 
paradigm of the offense is considered wrongful but not blameworthy and, 
therefore, not punishable. 
Now we can examine whether the doctor's and the officials' conduct 
satisfied the paradigm of homicide. There should be little doubt that they 
both intentionally killed human beings. The doctor in the conjoined 
twins case was aware that the death of Mary was a natural consequence of  
performing the operation. By the same token, the military officials were 
aware that the death of the passengers on the hijacked airplane and of the 
innocent people on the ground was a necessary result of shooting down 
the plane. This is all that is necessary to establish the paradigm of the 
offense of murder in both cases.'' Furthermore, both the doctor and the 
officials satisfy the paradigm of murder by virtue of affirmative acts and 
not by mere ommissions. This distinction turns out to be crucial since, as 
some scholars have noted, it is usually easier to justify letting a person die 
because of an omission than killing a person through a voluntary act.'? 
Both the conjoined twins case and the hijaked plane hypothetical, however, 
represent troubling instances of killing and not of letting die. 
25. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 3, at 22. 
26. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 554 (2000); Fletcher, supra note XI, at 102. 
27. See, e.g., Mir Puig, supra note 8, at 222-23. 
28. The awareness that the result is a natural consequence of the action to be performed 
suffices to establish the mental element required for the crime of murder. Model Penal 
Code $0 2.02(2)(b), ~ I O . Z ( I ) ( ~ )  (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
29. Fletcher, supra note XI, at 67-68. 
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However, as I previously stated, actions infringing the paradigm merely 
represent normal or typical instances of punishable crimes. They may, 
nonetheless, turn out not to be wrongful (and therefore, not punishable) 
if one of the exculpatory dimensions of the crime, a justification defense, 
is established.jO 
This can be better understood by an example. Suppose that Nice Guy 
broke the door of his Ford pickup. Did Nice Guy's action infringe the 
paradigm of an offense? According to the Model Penal Code (MPC), the 
paradigm of the only offense that he might have committed, criminal 
mischief, is composed of the following elements: (I) causing darnage, ( 2 )  
to the property of another." From the MPC's description of the offense of 
criminal mischief it follows that Nice Guy did not satisfy the paradigm of 
the crime since it requires that the property damaged be owned by a per- 
son other than the person who damages it. Since the statutory law pro- 
vides no prohibitions against the performance of conduct such as Nice 
Guy's, he does not need to give reasons that explain why he should not be 
punished and, therefore, his conduct is irrelevant for the criminal law 
from the very outset. Now, suppose that Nice Guy intentionally breaks the 
door of a car owned by somebody else. In this case Nice Guy infringed the 
paradigm of the offense of criminal mischief.32 That is, Nice Guy's conduct 
is normally or typically wrongfbl and, consequently, punishable. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that Nice Guy's conduct was wrongful 
since, according to the MPC, his conduct might not be wrongful if he 
establishes a valid claim of justification such as choice of evils (necessity)." 
For example, if Nice Guy broke the door in order to save a suffocating 
child that was left alone inside the car, we would say that even though he 
satisfied the elements of the paradigm of criminal mischief, he did not act 
wrongfully because his action is justified by virtue of the choice-of-evils 
defense. Consequently, we can conclude that the fact that Nice Guy 
infringed the paradigm of the offense of criminal mischief merely makes 
his action relevant for the criminal law in a way that actions not satisfying 
the elements of the offense (such as in the first example) are not. 
- -  - 
30. Of course, actions infringing the paradigm might not be punishable because, even- 
though wrongful, they are excused. 
31. Model Penal Code 5 zzo.3(1)(a) (Proposed Oficial Draft 1962). 
32. Id. 
33. Model Penal Code $5 3.01-3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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In sum, the fact that both the doctor and the officials satisfied the 
elements of the paradigm of homicide merely makes their action relevant 
for the criminal law. The action becomes relevant because it points in the 
direction of wrongdoing. However, in order to establish that their conduct 
was wrongful one must not only prove that it constitutes a normal or 
paradigmatic case of wrongdoing but also that it was wrongful all factors 
are considered. 
B. Justification and Wrongdoing 
The fact that their conduct satisfied the paradigm of the offense of homi- 
cide entails that their conduct is considered to be typically or normally 
wrongful. They, however, may deny that their conduct falls within the 
scope of the typical instances of wrongful behavior signified by the para- 
digm. That is, they may assert that their conduct is not wrongfil by try- 
ing to establish a claim of justification. Justifications are conventionally 
recognized permissions to infringe the paradigm of the offense. The per- 
mission is based on the assumption that under a certain set of circum- 
stances, infringing the paradigm is, all things considered, the right thing 
to do.34 According to the common law, recent statutory enactments such 
as those following the MPC, and comparative criminal law, these justi- 
ficatory claims invariably turn out to be three: (I) self-defense or defense 
of others (necessary defense), (2) public or law enforcement duty, and (3)  
necessity (choice of evils).35 
34. Some scholars, such as Mitchell Berman, believe that this description of justificatory 
defenses is wrong. According to chis strand in criminal law theory, for something to be jus- 
tified it need not be the "right thing to do" under the circumstances. It may suffice for the 
conduct to be "permissible" under the circumstances. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, 
Justification and Excuse, Law and Moraliry, 53 Duke L.J. I (2003). Notwithstanding its sev- 
eral appeals, I disagree with that position. My disagreement flows form the fact chat both 
in ordinary and philosophical parlance, to be "justified" in doing something usually entails 
something more than being "permitted" to do it. Therefore, when we claim to be "justi- 
f i ed  in doing something we usually mean that doing so is not merely a permissible course 
of action but the "right" one. 
35. In Anglo-American criminal law and the MPC see generally Robinson, supra note 3, 
ch. 4. In continental criminal law see, generally, Enrique Bacigalupo, Derecho Penal Parte 
General $9 49-52 ( ~ d  ed. 1999). 
Heinonline - -  10 New Crirn. L. Rev. 117 2007 
1 1  8 1 N E W  C R I M I N A L  LAW R E V I E W  I VOL.  10 1 N O .  1 I W I N T E R  2007 
I stated before that conduct infringing the paradigm of the offense is 
conduct that should be regarded as prima facie wrongful. A claim of jus- 
tification, however, serves to negate the prima facie wrongfulness of the act 
by establishing that the conduct was, all things being considered, the right 
thing to do under the  circumstance^.^^ If John kills Alan because it was 
necessary in order to ward off Alan's unjustified aggression, we may say 
that John's killing of Alan in self-defense, even though prima facie wrong- 
ful because it satisfied the paradigm of the offense of homicide, is not 
wrongful because, all things being considered, it was the right thing to do. 
By the same token, Nice Guy's breaking the window of a car in order to 
save a suffocating child inside would be prima facie wrongful because it 
satisfied the paradigm of the offense of criminal mischief but would 
nonetheless be justified under a theory of necessity because, all things con- 
sidered, his action was the right thing to do under the circumstances. The 
same would hold for an actor that is justified under any other conven- 
tional justificatory claim such as public duty. 
In sum, establishing a conventionally recognized justificatory claim 
defeats the prima facie judgment of wrongfulness implicit in an infraction 
of the paradigm of the offense because the existence of justificatory cir- 
cumstances makes the conduct, all things being considered, the right 
thing to do under the circumstances. 
Consequently, both the doctor and the officials may attempt to avoid 
punishment by showing that their conduct falls within the scope of a con- 
ventionally recognized justificatory claim that negates the wrongfulness of 
their action. Therefore, it is now necessary to analyze whether their con- 
duct can be justified under existing theories of necessary defense, necessity, 
or public or law enforcement duties. 
The opinions in the conjoined twins case lend some support to the 
notion that the doctor was acting in defense of Jodie. However, as I shall 
attempt to prove, the possibility of justifjring the doctor's conduct by virtue 
of necessary defense should be rejected from the outset. The reason for this 
is that necessary defense is only valid if one is repelling a wrongfirlag;qressi~n,~~ 
and such an attack is missing both in the conjoined twins case and in the 
36. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 26, at 792 (stating that "a justification speaks to the 
rightness of the act"). 
37. See, generally, Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 5 18.oz(b)(1) (jd ed. 
2001); Fletcher, supra note 26, at 760. 
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hijacked plane hypothetical. Even though the hct that Mary is not a wronfil 
attacker seems intuitively obvious, some scholars' work seems to lend support 
to the opposite assertion. Judith Jarvis Thompson, for example, has attempted 
to describe fetuses as unnatural intruders invading the sanctity of the moth- 
er's body3' If one accepts Thompson's position, it would only take a small 
step to conclude that a conjoined twin such as Mary could be portrayed as 
an "unnatural intruder" invading the body of her sister Jodie. 
This appears to be the metaphor that drives the parts of the opinions in 
the conjoined twins case that suggest that such a description of the situation 
is plausible. Characterizing these cases in such terms, despite being, to quote 
a scholar's take on the subject, a "tempting metaphor,"" should ultimately be 
rejected. The reason for this lies in the moral quality of the acts that may 
trigger a response in necessary defense. It seems obvious to me that the 
aggression triggering a justified defensive response should, at least, be 
reflective of human agency. Attacks lacking human agency are simply not 
of the same moral quality as acts that reflect human agency. As one scholar 
has noted,40 this is the lesson to be learned from Holmes's oft-cited asser- 
tion that "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and 
being ki~ked."~ '  
This difference should be taken into account when examining the law 
of necessary defense. The  relevance of the elementary distinction between 
attacks that are the product of human agency (intentionally hitting a per- 
son) and those that are not (being tripped and falling on top of a person) 
is one of the keys to understanding what constitutes a "wrongful attack" 
for the purposes of necessary defense. Because of their different moral 
quality, only attacks reflecting human agency should be considered 
"wrongful" in this context. This assertion finds much support in conti- 
nental criminal law doctrine.42 As the leading Spanish commentator in the 
law of necessary defense once stated in order to demonstrate why instances 
38. Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense o f  Abortion, I J .  Phil. & Pub. M. 47 (1971). 
39. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 863. 
40. Id. 
41. Oliver Wendel Holmes, The Common Law 3 (2004). 
42. In Germany, see Claus Roxin, Derecho Penal: Parte General 612 (Diego-Manuel 
Luz6n Peiia, Miguel Diaz y Garcia Conlledo, & Javier de Vicente Remesal trans., 1997). 
In Spain see Mir Puig, supra note 8, at 431. In Latin America see Alagia, Slokar, & Z f i o n i ,  
supra note 9, at 618. 
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lacking human agency are not wrongful attacks that may trigger a justified 
defensive reaction, 
The addressees of legal norms are persons capable of intelligence and will-for- 
mation. Therefore, legal norms may prohibit-r declare to be wrongful-a 
person's voluntary acts but they can not prohibit natural events or causal 
processes that are not the product of human will (such as the production of 
harmful results produced by a person who is unconscious or an epilepti~)~' 
Ultimately, even if one concedes that Mary is attacking Jodie (and whether 
this is ultimately true is also dubious), it seems clear that such an attack 
should not trigger a justified response in necessary defense because the 
absence of human agency precludes the possibility of finding that there is 
a wrongful attack. Summarily stated, if there is no act there can be no 
wrongful attack. 
The situation regarding the hijacked plane hypothetical is more com- 
plicated. While the officials could obviously claim that the hijackers are 
wrongful attackers, they most certainly cannot claim the same thing about 
the passengers inside the plane or about the people on the ground that will 
die as a result of the plane going down. They (people inside the plane and 
people on the ground) are innocent non-harmfd bystanders. It seems fairly 
clear from this that there is no possibility of justifying either the doctor's 
or the officials' conduct under a theory of necessary defense. 
One may try to justify the officials' conduct under a theory of public 
duty or law enforcement authority. Ultimately, however, this claim is 
equally implausible. It is settled law that the use of deadly force pursuant 
to law enforcement authority or a public duty is limited to a small number 
of instances. Namely, deadly force can never be justified under a theory of 
law enforcement authority or public duty if it presents a substantial risk of 
injury to innocent non-harmful third parties. This is made explicit in the 
Model Penal Code.44 Since by shooting down the plane the officials create 
a substantial risk of death both for the passengers inside the plane and the 
people on the ground, their conduct cannot be justified under a law 
enforcement authority or public duty exemption. 
43. Diego-Manuel Luz6n Pefia, Aspecros Esenciales de la Legitima Defensa 127 (td ed. 
2002). 
44. See Model Penal Code 5 3.07(s)(a)(i), (t)(b)(3) (Proposed OEcial Draft 1962); 
Dressier, supra note 37, § 21.05 (B), (C). 
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Courts and scholars have attempted to resolve these fact situations 
using the justificatory necessity defense. This seems to be the position of 
the drafiers of the MPC as Notwithstanding its several appeals, this 
solution finally turns out to be untenable from a deontological point of 
view because it ends up justifying by virtue of necessity the killing of an 
innocent human being in order to save another human being. This solu- 
tion finds no support under the common law that, for good reason, does 
not recognize a defense of justifiable necessity in cases of intentional 
h~mic ide .~ '  In Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, for example, the Queen's 
Bench rejected the possibility of justifying homicide by virtue of the 
necessity defense because, among other things, they believed that it was 
impossible to measure the "comparative value of [human] lives . . . ."47 The  
great Benjamin Cardozo was even more explicit on  this point when he 
stated that "[wlhere two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, 
there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing 
of another. There is no rule of human jettison." Cardozo then urges us to 
ask, "[wlho shall choose in such an hour between the victims and the 
saved?"48 He was evidently suggesting that nobody could legitimately 
choose between them. Underlying his claim is the sound Kantian princi- 
ple that no human being can be used as a means to an end.@This position 
dovetails with religious teachings. In one famous passage of the Talmud, 
for example, a young man is advised, "be killed and do not kill; do you 
think that your blood is redder than his? Perhaps his is redder than 
yours."50 In a similar vein, one could ask if Jodie's blood is redder than 
Mary's or if the blood of the innocent passengers and people on the 
ground is redder than the blood of the people in the Empire State Building. 
This is not to say that taking risks that endanger human life can never 
be justified. It appears to be settled law that it is not wrongful to take a 
45. Model Penal Code § 3.07, cmt. c, at 131 (Oficial Draft and Revised Comments 
1780). 
46. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 30 (1979), Regina v. 
Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), U.S. v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (Pa. 1842). See 
also Perkins & Boyce, supra note 8, at 1055-57; George l? Fletcher, The Individualization 
of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1267,1278-77 (1974). 
47. 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287. 
48. Benjamin Cardozo, Law and Literature 113 (1730) (emphasis added). 
47. Kant, supra note 7, at 60; Fletcher, supra note 46, at 1277. 
50. Talmud, Pesahim 25 (b). 
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risk that endangers human life if the risk is outweighed by forceful con- 
siderations. Let's say, for example, that someone drives at dangerously high 
speeds in order to take a dying person to the hospital. Taking such risks is 
permissible under both Anglo-American5' and continental criminal law.5z 
The reason for this lies in the fact that the absolute prohibition against the 
taking of human life only applies if it is done "intentionally." When the 
possibility of the death of an innocent human being is merely "probable," 
in contrast to "inevitable," there is consensus, even among religious schol- 
ars, that the absolute prohibition against killing innocent life is simply 
inappli~able.~~ Philosophers and religious commentators use the theory of 
"double effect" to justify such a solution.54 According to this theory, the 
driver would be justified in taking such a risk because his intention was to 
save the dying passenger by rushing him to the hospital and not to kill or 
to put innocent lives at risk. The killing or putting at risk of innocent lives 
would be described under the double effect theory as an unintended con- 
sequence of his action. Under the MPC this solution is even more obvious 
since one need not resort to the theory of necessity to justify the conduct 
of the person driving the car in order to save someone who is dying 
because the action would simply not satisfy the minimum culpabiliry 
requirements of the offense of homicide. This follows from the fact that 
the driver's conduct should not be characterized as reckless or negligent 
since the risk taken was reasonable under the  circumstance^.^^ 
In sum, the taking of innocent human life cannot be justified in cases 
of intentional killing. However, taking risks that endanger the lives of 
human beings might be justified as long as there are good reasons for 
doing so and the occurrence of death is not certain. 
51. See Model Penal Code 5 2.02 (z)(c) cmt. 3, at 237 (Oficial Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
52. MuAoz Conde & Garcia Arb, supra note 16., at 29495. 
53. See Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification 
Defense-Criteria for Political Action and the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
I, 12-13 (1986) (citing authorities). 
54. See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 152-59 (3d ed. 2000). 
5s. I would like to clarify that some scholars argue that, if the actor's purpose was to 
save lives and not to kill, the doctrine of double effect can also be used to justify engaging 
in conduct that inevitably will produce the death of another person. I believe, however, 
that engaging in conduct that is practically certain to cause the death of an innocent 
human being can never be justified. 
Heinonline - -  10 New Crirn. L. Rev. 122 2007 
N O R M A T I V E  G A P S  I N  T H E  C R I M I N A L  LAW 1 123 
The basic principle that prohibits the intentional taking of human life 
underlies the general theory of necessity elaborated by continental criminal 
law doctrine as well. Therefore, most, if not all, continental criminal law 
scholars believe that a purposeful or knowing homicide can never be jus- 
tified by virtue of ne~essi ty .~~ Their position is summed up by Andenaes, 
a famous Norweigan scholar, in the following manner: "[elven though 
many lives could be saved by the sacrifice of one, this would hardly be jus- 
tifiable. It would conflict with the general attitude toward the inviolability 
of human life to interfere in this way with the course of  event^."^' In other 
words, the doctor in the conjoined twins case cannot relinquish the life of 
Mary as a means to save the life of Jodie and validly claim to be j~stified.~" 
By the same token, the military officials cannot sacrifice the lives of the 
passengers in order to save the lives of the occupants of the Empire State 
Building and claim to be j u ~ t i f i e d . ~ ~  
Therefore, it turns out that the doctor's and the oFficials' conduct 
infringes the paradigm of the offense of murder without satisfying the 
conventionally accepted criteria of justification. However, as I will try to 
demonstrate later, there is a way of recognizing the non-wrongful nature 
of their actions without having to justify their conduct. 
56. See, e.g., Alagia, Slokar, & Zaffaroni, supra note 9, at 631 (stating that it is impos- 
sible to weigh the value of competing human lives). 
57. Johanna Andenaes, The General Part of  the Criminal Law of Norway 169 (Thomas 
Ogle trans., 1965). 
58. Several scholars have questioned this basic tenet of the common law. See, e.g., 
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.1 ( d ) ( ~ )  (2d ed. 2003). Professor Joshua 
Dressler seems to flirt with this solution as well. Dressler, supra note 27, 922.04. The 
drafrers of the Model Penal Code broke, as well, from this tradition when they stated that 
it would be possible to grant a necessity defense to actors who kill innocent human beings 
in order to save a larger amount of lives. See Model Penal Code § 3.02, cmt. 3, at 14-15 
(Oficial Draft and Revised Comments 1980). This position strikes me as clearly objec- 
tionable from deontological grounds. I cannot accept the view that human lives can be 
used as a means to achieve an end (even if the end is to save human lives). For this reason 
the common law viewpoint is preferable to the MPC's. Furthermore, the MPC solution 
has never gained acceptance in the civil law tradition. It seems clear to continental crimi- 
nal law scholars that the death of a non-harmfd person can never be justified under a the- 
ory of necessity. See, e.g., Hans-Heinrich Jescheck & Thomas Weigend, Tratado de 
Derecho Penal: Parte General 387 (Miguel Olmedo Cardenete trans., zd ed. 2002). 
59. O f  course, the officials could validly claim self-defense against the hijackers. Self- 
defense, however, is unavailable as a defense to the killing of the passengers since they were 
innocent third parties who did not unlawfully attack the occupants of the building. 
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Contrary to common scholarly opinion,'O even though it is clear that 
a claim of justification negates wrongdoing, it is not at all clear whether 
an absence of justification necessarily implicates wrongfulness. I have 
asked many people about the proper solution to these hypotheticals. 
Most, if not all, conclude that both the doctor's and the military officials' 
conduct should not be considered wrongful." This common intuition, 
which I most certainly share, flies in the face of the traditional theory of 
wrongdoing as an unjustified infraction of the paradigm of the offense. 
If it is true, as I argue, that punishment is imposed for wrongdoing, and 
if our intuitions regarding the non-wrongful nature of the doctor's and 
the officials' conduct are sound, it follows that wrongdoing is not con- 
clusively established by proving that there was an unjustified infraction 
of the paradigm because, as I have attempted to prove, both the doctor 
and the officials unjustifiably infringed the paradigm of the offense of 
homicide. 
While it is true that the existence of justification negates wrongdoing 
the contrary is not true. An absence of justification does not categorically 
entail wrongdoing. The connection between justification and wrongdoing 
is more complicated. The absence of justification strongly suggests the 
existence of wrongdoing without definitely establishing it. In other words, 
the existence of wrongdoing is presumed by a showing of an unjustified 
infraction of the paradigm of the offense. Nonetheless, this presumption 
may be rebutted. The defense that serves to rebut this presumption of 
wrongdoing is what I have come to call the "normative gap" defense. 
In the next section I will try to explain how it is conceptually possible 
to describe an action as a non-wrongful infraction of the paradigm even 
though it is not justified. In other words, I will show how it is possible for 
a normative gap to exist between an absence of justification and a finding 
of wrongdoing. Afterwards, in the last section, I will explain how this 
normative gap works and, therefore, how an actor may attempt to negate 
60. For examples of scholars who hold this common opinion in the United States see 
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 8-81. In Spain, see Mir Puig, supra note 8, at 164; and in Latin 
America, see Alagia, Slokar, & Zaffaroni, supra note 9, at 590. 
61. For example, Professor Fletcher, an avowed kantian and retributivist, has expressed 
to me that he considers that, event though not justified, both the doctor and the officials 
are acting in a non-wrongful manner. 
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the wrongfulness of an action infringing the paradigm without establish- 
ing a valid claim of justification. 
C. The Normative Gap and Positive and Negative Approaches 
to Wrongdoing 
The relationship between an absence of justification and wrongdoing is 
similar to the relationship between enacted law and law in principle. The 
distinction between enacted law and law in principle is more easily 
expressed in other languages. In Spanish, for example, the query has to do 
with the connection between key (enacted or positive law) and derecho (law 
in ~ r inc ip le ) .~~  The positive law (ley) is composed of the law enacted in the 
manner established by a legal system's rule of recognit i~n.~~ In the 
American legal system, for example, the positive law consists of the con- 
ventionally recognized legal materials, namely, the Constitution, statutes, 
and case law.64 Law in principle (derecho), on the contrary, is composed of 
the basic principles that are immanent in the legal order. These basic prin- 
ciples could be found in the specific rules of the positive law but do not 
necessarily need to be. Derecho transcends the positive law. This explains 
why, on occasions, there is a gap between the enacted law and the law in 
principle. This is precisely the gist of Dworkin's criticism of Hart's concept 
of law. Hart thought that this gap was filled by morality (or politics) while 
Dworkin thinks that derecho, in the form of his principles, fills this gap.65 
Furthermore, the law in principle is more basic and fundamental than the 
enacted law. As one scholar has noted, what is taught in most criminal law 
courses is derecho and not key.6That is why in Spain they study "derecho 
62. As Professor Fletcher has noted, even though lg, and Arerho are easily translatable 
into many languages, the translation to English is quite difficult. For example, the 
Germans have the terms gesetz and Recht and the French have the terms loi and Droit. See 
George I? Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought 35 (1996). 
63. I am employing the concept "rule of recognitionn in the sense given to it by Hart. 
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 94 (zd ed. 1994). 
64. Certain other legal rules in the American legal system form part of the positive law. 
Administrative regulations are good examples of these rules. 
65. Dworkin readily accepts the difference between positive law and law in principle. 
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 217 (1986). 
66. Fletcher, supra note 62, at 209. 
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penal" and not "lq, penal" and in Germany they study "Strafrecht" and not 
' 6  Strafgesetz." Thus, in the United States we study the basic principles of 
criminal law and not merely the laws relating to the field. That is, we study 
law in principle and not merely enacted law. 
The same is true for the relationship between an unjustified infringe- 
ment of the paradigm and wrongdoing. An unjustified infringement of 
the paradigm is equivalent to ley and wrongdoing is equivalent to derecho. 
In other words, satisfying the elements of the offense unjustifiably only 
establishes wrongdoing according to the positive law (this includes the 
conventional rules of justification). However, wrongdoing in principle is 
not conclusively established by demonstrating this. There is a gap between 
an unjustified infraction of the and wrongdoing in much the 
same manner that there is a gap between ley and derecho. Just as the positive 
law merely points in the direction of the law in principle, an unjustified 
commission of the elements of the offense merely points in the direction 
of wrongdoing. 
While the traditional opinion among scholars has been that the absence 
of justification implies wrongdoing, this need not necessarily be the case. 
For the sake of brevity I will call the former thesis the negative approach 
to wrongdoing and the latter, my thesis, the positive approach to wrong- 
doing. As one can see, the answer to the question of whether the doctor's 
and the officials' conduct was wronghl depends on which approach one 
adopts. For those in favor of the negative approach to wrongdoing, there 
is no other option than saying that their conduct was wrongful. O n  the 
contrary, to those in favor of the positive approach to wrongdoing, the 
possibility of a normative gap between an unjustified infringement of the 
paradigm and wrongdoing opens up the likelihood of negating the wrong- 
fulness of their actions. 
Now, just in the same way as the gap between ky and dpecho is grounded 
in principles, the normative gap between an absence of justification and 
wrongdoing must be grounded in principles. Various principles may 
account for this normative gap. During the next sections, I will try to 
identify a principle that might explain the gap. What ultimately is at 
stake is the meaning of wrongdoing. For the advocates of the negative 
theory, the meaning of wrongdoing is exhausted by the unjustified infrac- 
tion of the paradigm. For a defender of the positive approach, like me, 
wrongdoing is composed of something transcending the conventional 
rules. 
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IV. THE REASONS THEORY O F  WRONGDOING 
In this section I will develop a theory of wrongdoing that can succesllly 
account for the normative gap between an absence of justification and 
wrongdoing in much the same way as Dworkin's theory of integrity or of 
principles accounts for the gap between hy and &echo. I will call this theory 
the reasons theory of wrongdoing. I will illustrate how the reasons theory of 
wrongdoing adequately accounts for this normative gap in three steps. First, 
I will provide a definition of wrongdoing according to the theory. Second, I 
will explain how my reasons theory accounts for the fact that justificatory 
claims negate wrongdoing. Third, I will explicate how my reasons theory 
provides a vehicle for negating wrongdoing without justifying the conduct. 
A. Defining Wrongdoing According to the Reasons Theory 
1. The Need for a Political Theory of Wrongdoing 
Fletcher once stated, "criminal law is a species of political and moral phi- 
losophy." Surprisingly, many commentators have focused almost entirely 
on the moral component of wrongdoingG7 while ignoring its political 
aspect.68 Moral philosophy may provide an answer to the question regard- 
ing whether a particular person deserves to be punished, but it alone can- 
not provide an answer to the question about whether the state, as a whole, 
is legitimized to punish offenders for their morally wronghl conduct. An 
inquiry into the realm of political philosophy is necessary to answer such 
a question. Furthermore, even if we conclude that the state has a legiti- 
mate right to punish, we are still left with the additional task of ascertain- 
ing the political limitations of the state's right to punish. Once again, a 
sound political theory is needed in order to establish these boundaries. 
67. The  most prominent exception to this trend is the work of Douglas Husak. One 
can clearly see how much of his work aims at working out  apoliticalconception of wrong- 
doing that serves as a limit to legitimate state intervention with individual liberties. See, 
e.g., Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law As Last Resort, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 207 
(2004); Douglas Husak, Legalize This! The Case for Decriminalizing Drugs (2002). 
68. The  work of moral philosophers such as John Gardner illustrates the point. His 
work is primarily, if not entirely, concerned with providing a moral justification for the 
criminal law without paying attention to the political implications of his theory. For a 
good example of this see John Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, in Appraising Strict Liabiliry 
51 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005). 
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The principle of legality, for example, represents one of the procedural 
limits of the state's right to punish. The principle of nullurn crirnen nullurn 
poena sine lege limits the state not only because of moral considerations but 
because of political considerations as well. Political considerations such as, 
but not limited to, respect for democracy, the doctrine of separation of 
powers, and a strong commitment to the rule of law lie at the core of the 
principles underlying the exigency of respect to legality.69 
In the next section I aim to flesh out a political conception of wrong- 
doing that will serve as a substantive limit to the state's power to punish. 
Additionally, the particular conception of wrongdoing I will defend pro- 
vides a cogent conceptual apparatus that can account in a principled man- 
ner for the normative gap between a finding of unjustified conduct and a 
determination of wrongdoing. 
2. The Political Theory of Wrongdoing, Legal Goods, 
and the Harm Principle 
In a liberal and democratic state, the prohibition of conduct must be 
based on sufficient and sound reasons. This is precisely why commenta- 
tors are becoming increasingly preoccupied with the problem of "over- 
criminali~ation."'~ Overcriminalization is regarded as problematic because 
it calls into question the legitimacy of the state's power to prohibit con- 
duct. Both scholars and the public at large are alarmed when seemingly 
innocuous conduct is prohibited by legislatures without the existence of 
sound reasons that warrant such a ~ t i o n . ~ '  
The state can never legitimately prohibit people from eating apples, for 
example, unless there is a sound reason for doing so. Say that a recent 
plague has infected the world's apples. In this case, the legislature could 
legitimately prohibit eating apples if it is for the purpose of saving people's 
lives. They cannot prohibit it just because they want to or because they 
think that eating apples is inherently evil. A sound reason for punishing 
such conduct could be established, for example, if the state could prove, 
69. Roxin, supra note 42, at 144-45. 
70. See, e.g., Stuart l? Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: 
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533 
(1997)~ and Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, I 
Buff. Crim. L. Rw. 599 (1998). 
71. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755 (2004). 
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in accordance with Mill's harm principle, that this is necessary in order to 
prevent harm to others. 
Since the state needs sufficient sound reasons to legitimately prohibit 
conduct, it would make sense that the definition of what constitutes pro- 
hibited wrongful conduct should be constructed accordingly. Consequently, 
I will define wrongful conduct as conduct for which there are sufficient 
sound reasons for prohibiting it. 
This definition finds support in comparative criminal law. Many conti- 
nental criminal law theorists, for example, believe that conduct can only 
be wrongful if it threatens what they call a "legal (bien juridic0 in 
Spanish and rechtsgiit in German)." The  concept of legal goods has a rich 
intellectual history that can be traced back to the works of some of the 
most influential criminal law scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.74 The concept was developed as a way of addressing the pressing 
concern of limiting the state's power to prohibit conduct. This concern was 
echoed by the famous Italian scholar, Francesco Carrara, as early as 1859: 
If divine justice were the sole purpose to be achieved through punishment, 
the State would be led to censure conduct even where there is no palpable 
harm. This would lead to the State's usurpation of divine power and to a 
tyrannization of human thought in the name of vice and sin.75 
Currently, however, continental scholars find themselves divided with 
regards to what is the appropriate meaning and function of the concept of 
legal goods.76 For some, a legal good is merely an abbreviation of the leg- 
islative purpose underlying the creation of an offense. When defined in 
72. For a discussion of the meaning and scope of the concept of a "legal g o o d  in 
English see Bernd Shunemann, The System of Criminal Wrongs: The Concept of Legal 
Goods and Victim-based Jurisprudence As a Bridge between the General and Special Parts 
of the Criminal Code, 7 BuK Crim. L. Rev. 551 (2004). 
73. See, e.g., I Juan J. Bustos Ramira & H e r n h  Hormdbal  MalarCe, Lecciones de 
Derecho Penal 27-44 (1997). 
74. The emergence of the concept of legal good has been traced back to the German 
scholar Birnbaum. However, it was not until the works of von Liszt that the concept actu- 
ally acquired a substantive content that was meant to limit the lawmaking power of the 
legislature to define criminal conduct. See Mir Puig, supra note 8, at 129; Shunemann, 
supra note 72, at 552 and accompanying footnotes. 
75. Francesco Carrara, I Programa de Derecho Criminal 18 (1996). 
76. See generally Shunemann, supra note 72, at 552. 
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this manner the function of the concept is to aid in the interpretation of 
the particular offenses by looking at the legislative purpose behind them. 
I will call this position the formalist approach to legal goods. The other 
approach to legal goods defines them as those things that a person needs 
for his self-realization and the development of his personality in society." 
For them, following the original understanding of the concept, its func- 
tion is to limit the legislature's authority to define crimes. I will call this 
position the substantive approach to legal goods. 
For the followers of the formalist approach, a legal good is constituted 
by whatever interest the state sought to protect by prohibiting the con- 
duct. As such, this conception of legal goods strikes me as entirely vacu- 
ous since it does not serve the purpose of limiting the law-making author- 
ity of the legislature with regards to defining crimes. Furthermore, as 
Shiinemann has convincingly argued, when defined in this manner, the 
concept can't even aid in the interpretation of the criminal law (as some 
German scholars contend it can) because "it runs the risk of becoming cir- 
cular by placing the purpose of the law before its interpretation, even 
though the purpose depends on the results of that interpretation."" 
Consequently, both because of its incapacity to limit the state's power to 
define crimes and because of its circularity, the formalist approach to legal 
goods should be discarded. 
O n  the other hand, the substantive approach to legal goods is a power- 
ful tool with which to limit the legislative authority to create offenses. 
Under this approach, if the state cannot ascertain a legitimate legal good 
that is protected by prohibiting the conduct, there is no wrongfulness and, 
therefore, no punishment can be imposed for an infraction of such an 
offense." Their approach leads them to include life, property, and liberty 
as paradigmatic examples of legal goods while, on the other hand, the 
public enforcement of moral values would not constitute a legal good 
because this would impede the self-realization of many persons that do 
not share the same values as the people that are trying to enforce them." 
Thus, under this theory, the criminalization of conduct such as incest, 
77. Francisco Mufioz Conde, Teoria General del Deliro 236 (3d ed. 2003). See also Mir 
Puig, supra note 8, at 128-30. 
78. Shiinemann, supra note 72, at 253. 
79. See, e.g., Mir Puig, supra nore 8, at 128-30. 
80. See id. 
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bestiality, and consensual sexual acts between homosexuals would be ille- 
gitimate if one could not find a legal good protected by such criminaliza- 
tion other than the enforcement of moral values. 
The continental theory of legal goods in its substantive version dovetails 
with John Stuart Mill's use of the harm principle as a means to limit the 
power of the state to prohibit conduct. According to the aforementioned 
principle, the state can legitimately prohibit conduct only if it causes 
harm to others." Mill's thesis was later echoed and further developed by 
H.L.A. Hart. Hart concluded that it is illegitimate for the state to prohibit 
conduct merely because it is considered immoral since doing so would 
contradict the basic value of individual liberty. He defended this view by 
stating that the distress caused to ~ e o p l e  when others conduct themselves 
in what they consider to be an immoral fashion cannot constitute a punish- 
able harm since this would be "tantamount to punishing them simply 
because others object to what they do; and the only liberty that could 
coexist with this extension of the utilitarian principle [harm principle] is 
liberty to do those things to which no one seriously objects. Such liberty 
plainly is quite nugatory."82 In other words, according to Hart, the crimi- 
nalization of acts because of their immorality is illegitimate because it 
assigns only trifling importance to the fundamental right of individual 
liberty (i.e., autonomy). 
The rationale underlying the substantive theory of legal goods and both 
Mill's and Hart's theory of harm as a substantive limit to the legislature's 
power to prohibit conduct is precisely the same one underlying my rea- 
sons theory of wrongdoing. Conduct that does not threaten a legal good 
or that does not "cause harm to others" is conduct for which the state does 
not have sufficient and sound reasons for prohibiting it. 
Up to this point, I have tried to show through comparative criminal law 
doctrines and through the philosophical ideas of Mill and Hart that it is 
illegitimate for the state to declare conduct to be wrongful if it does not 
have, just as my reasons theory holds, sufficient reasons for doing so. I will 
now attempt to show that not only would it be illegitimate for the state to 
do such a thing, but that it might also be unconstitutional. 
The constitutionalization of the substantive criminal law is not new in 
civil law countries. German commentators unanimously agree that the 
81. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 10-11 (1978). 
82. H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 47 (1963). 
Heinonline - -  10 New Crirn. L. Rev. 131 2007 
1 3 2  1 N E W  C R I M I N A L  LAW R E V I E W  I VOL.  10 1 N O .  1 I W I N T E R  2007 
principle that there can be no punishment without mens rea (i.e., culpa- 
bility) is constitutionally req~i red . '~  Likewise, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court recognized the constitutional stature of the aforementioned princi- 
ple when they declared that the state was required to punish the offender 
on the basis of the culpability with which he committed the ~ffense. '~ In 
a similar vein, both the Italian Constitutional Court and the Canadian 
Supreme Court recognized rather recently that the defense of mistake of 
law is constitutionally required under the fault principle. 
This trend towards the constitutionalization of the substantive criminal 
law has culminated in the explicit recognition of several of its basic princi- 
ples in the constitutional text of several civil law countries. This is how the 
continental doctrine of legal goods, in its substantive version, found its way 
to the text of the Argentinean Constitution. The first paragraph of article 19 
of the Constitution of Argentina expressly states that private acts that "do 
not harm third parties are beyond State authority and can only be adjudged 
by Argentinean scholars believe that the effect of this paragraph is 
to constitutionalize the substantive version of the legal goods theory.86 
Regrettably, the constitutionalization of substantive criminal law has 
not fared so well in the courts of this country. The Supreme Court's 
approach to the constitutionalization of some of the basic principles of 
substantive criminal law has been haphazard to say the least. Usually, 
when the Supreme Court finally gets itself to constitutionalize some aspect 
of the criminal law it ends up either reversing the initial judgment or 
delivering an ulterior decision that seems to be incompatible with previ- 
ous ones. Consequently, most of the attempts to constitutionalize basic 
criminal law principles in this country have failed. This was the case with 
the Supreme Court's shortlived incursion into constit~tionalizin~ the act 
requirement (i.e., no liability without actus reus) in the Robinson and 
pow ell decision^.^' The Supreme Court's inability to grapple with the basic 
doctrines of the criminal law becomes even more apparent when one exam- 
ines their chaotic pronouncements with regards to the different burdens of 
persuasion that should attach to the establishment of the various elements 
83. See, e.g., Roxin, supra note 42, at roo. 
84. STC, July 4, 1991 (B.O.E., no. 19910729, P. 150). 
85. Const. Arg. Art. 19. 
86. See generally Alagia, Siokar, & Zdaroni, supra note 9, at 126--28. 
87. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
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of a crime. Their burden-of-persuasion jurisprudence from MullaneyRR to 
ApprendiRS and, most recently, in Bkzkely9"and Booker," reveals that the 
Court seems to be at a loss with regards to how to make principled dis- 
tinctions between elements of an offense and defenses (Mullaney and 
Patterson) and between elements of the crime and sentencing factors 
(McMilhn,S2 Apprendi, Bkzkely, and Booker). 
However, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has sometimes 
appeared to be confused with regards to how to properly and coherently 
interpret basic criminal law doctrines, it is nonetheless true that during the 
last few years the Court seems more willing to entertain the idea of con- 
stitionalizing fundamental criminal law principles. More specifically, the 
Court's recent decisions constitutionalizing several aspects of the criminal 
law such as the requirements of culpability and proportionality in death 
penalty cases"   at kin^'^ and Coker") and the substantive meaning of an 
"offense" and its procedural implications (Apprendi, Ring,96 Blakely, and 
Booker) reflect that the time may be ripe for a new wave of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the previously neglected area of substantive criminal law. 
As one scholar recently noted, these decisions suggest that "the constitu- 
tional irrelevance for American criminal law might finally be overcome."97 
The crowning achievement of this recent trend is the Supreme Court's 
constitutionalization of a reasons theory of wrongdoing based on some- 
thing akin to Mill's "harm principle" in its historic decision of Lawrence v. 
In Lawrence, the Court determined that state statutes prohibiting 
consensual homosexual relationships violated a person's basic interest in 
liberty and autonomy as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth 
88. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
89. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 5 3 0  U.S. 466 (2000). 
90. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
91. United State v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
92. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
93. See generally Daniel Suleiman, The Capital Punishment Exception: A Case for 
Constitutionalizing the Substantive Criminal Law, 104 Col. L. Rev. 426 (2004). 
94. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
95. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
96. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
97. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 
Hastings L.J. 509, 514 (2004). 
98. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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and Fourteenth Amendments of the Const i t~ t ion .~Vn surprising lan- 
guage that entirely coincides with the substantive theory of legal goods 
and with Mill's harm principle as a limit to state power, the majority opin- 
ion, citing portions of Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers, stated that 
"[Tlhe fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed 
a particular practice as immoral is not a suficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice."'@' The aforesaid language parallels H.L.A. 
Hart's previously cited claim with regards to how the public enforcement 
of moral values runs counter to the recognition of liberty and autonomy 
as fundamental values. Additionally, notice the express recognition by the 
court that, in order for conduct to be prohibited the state must have suf 
jc ient  reasons for doing so. This reflects that the Court might be working, 
implicitly, with a reasons theory of wrongdoing and punishment. 
Moreover, the claim that the Court intended to constitutionalize Mill's 
harm principle is further reinforced by the majority's strong reliance on its 
previous decision of Planned Parenthood v. C a ~ q . ' ~ '  In Casq, the Court 
reaffirmed that a woman's decision to have an abortion before the time of 
viability of the fetus was constitutionally protected by the right to liberty 
and autonomy secured by the due process clauses of the Constitution and 
that states could not prohibit the realization of such abortions. The fol- 
lowing language in Casey lends strong support to my claim that something 
akin to Mill's harm principle can be derived from the right to liberty and 
autonomy secured by the due process clause: "Some of us as individuals 
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that 
cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to deJne the liberty ofall, not 
to mandate our own moral The Court explicitly relied on the 
above-cited language when deciding Lawrence. 
Finally, the Court in Lawrence expressly acknowledged, once again, that 
the fact that the majority of the people believe certain conduct to be 
immoral is not sufficient reason for a state to prohibit the conduct. 
Dismissing the relevance of the perceived immorality of the conduct at 
issue in Lawrence, the Court asserted that even though some people's 
condemnation of allegedly immoral behavior reflects "convictions accepted 
99. Id. at 578. 
roo. Id. at 577. 
101. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
roz. Id. at 850. 
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as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus deter- 
mine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the 
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the 
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through 
operation of the criminal law."'03 The Court answered that question, as we 
all know, with a forcell "no." This is precisely the gist of Lawrence's holding: 
the state is constitutionally prohibited from using the criminal law as a 
method for enforcing morality. 
The holdings in Lawrence and Carey reveal that, slowly but surely, the 
Supreme Court is gravitating towards a theory of crime and punishment 
that presupposes that for a conduct to be wrongful and, therefore, pun- 
ishable, there must be sufficient and sound reasons for prohibiting it. 
Additionally, in the spirit of Mill's harm principle and the substantive ver- 
sion of legal goods as a way of limiting state power, the Supreme Court 
has stated that the enforcement of morality does not constitute a "suffi- 
cient reason" for prohibiting conduct.'" In sum, these recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court lend constitutional support to my reasons theory 
defining wrongful conduct as "conduct for which the State has sufficient 
sound reasons for prohibiting it."'05 
My definition of wrongful conduct also finds support in the constitu- 
tional practice of many state courts of invalidating, under their local due 
103. 539 U.S. at 571. 
104. Id. at 560. 
105 I admit that there are other plausible ways of interpreting the aforementioned 
cases. Someone might point out, for example, that these Supreme Court cases d o  not 
necessarily mean that the constitution compels the adoption of a reasons theory of wrong- 
doing. It could be argued that they mean nothing more than that the right to privacy 
extends to certain fundamental decisions such as having an abortion or deciding whether 
to engage in certain consensual sexual acts. Additionally, someone may point out that there 
appear to countless "victimless crimes" in the books and that courts don't appear to be will- 
ing to strike them down as unconstitutional anytime soon. 
Regarding the first objection, I can only say that my interpretation of the above cited 
case law is at least as plausible as any alternative version. However, my analysis has the 
advantage of grouping what can be thought of as a collection of haphazard decisions into 
a coherent set of judgments that lend support to the reasons theory of wrongdoing. With 
regard to the second objection, I believe that only time will tell whether victimless crimes 
are in fact deemed unconstitutional under a reasons theory of wrongdoing. My impres- 
sion is that as time goes by the courts will find more and more victimless crimes to  be 
unconstitutional. 
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process clause, any legislation that bears no substantial relationship to 
injury to the public.'" For example, a state court used this doctrine to 
invalidate an ordinance that prohibited catching frogs in a particular lake 
for no reason whatsoever.'07 Decisions such as this one illuminate the sub- 
stance of wrongdoing The mere fact that the legislature prohibits the con- 
duct is not sufficient for a court finding of wrongdoing. The legislation 
must, additionally, provide sufficient reasons for prohibiting the conduct. 
In the next couple of sections I will explore how claims of justification 
negate wrongfulness by providing reasons that outweigh the state's reasons 
for prohibiting the conduct and how a claim of a "normative gap defense" 
negates wrongfulness by providing reasons that roughly offset the reasons 
the state has for prohibiting it. 
B. Assesing Whether the Doctor's and the Officials' Conduct is 
Justifiable under a Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing and Justification 
In the first sections of this article I tried to show that both the doctor's 
action of separating the twins and the officials' act of shooting down the 
plane could not be justified under a theory of necessity. In those sections 
my position against justifjring their actions was based on the Kantian 
argument that taking the life of an innocent (non-harmful) human being 
can never be justified. Now I will try to show that under the reasons theory 
of wrongdoing and justification one is also obligated to deny them a jus- 
tificatory defense. 
I believe that both wrongdoing and justifications are a matter of reasons. 
As I previously tried to demonstrate, conduct is wrongful if, and only if, 
the state has sufficient reasons for prohibiting it. Justificatory claims are 
related, as well, to reasons. Earlier, I defined a claim of justification as a 
defense that negates the wrongfulness of the conduct by affirming that it 
was, all things being considered, the right thing to do. This definition, 
though accurate, needs to be specified. Conduct is the right thing to do, 
106. The standard of  no substantial injury to the public was adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). However, since Nebbia v. New h r k ,  
the Court has been reluctant to apply this doctrine. 291 U.S. 502, (1934). Nonetheless, the 
doctrine is very much alive in state constitutional case law. For more information on the 
subject see LaFave, supra note 58, § 3.3(b). 
107. City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. zd 1078 (La. 1978). 
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and therefore justified, if the reasons in favor of performing the conduct 
outweigh the reasons the state had for prohibiting the cond~ct . '~ '  Since 
other scholars have effectively demonstrated the appeal of defining justifi- 
catory claims in this manner, I will not go over this here.'09 
What is of more importance at this point is to show why, under my rea- 
sons approach to justifications, both the doctor's and the officials' conduct 
must be regarded as unjustified. Take the case of the doctor as an example. 
His reason for performing the conduct is based on utilitarian considera- 
tions, namely, saving as many lives as possible. The reason the state had to 
prohibit the conduct in question is based on the deontological principle 
that the taking of innocent human life is always morally wrong. Since 
there are strong reasons both in favor of performing the conduct and 
against doing so, it is impossible for a pluralistic society to determine 
which side is right. Therefore, the doctor's conduct cannot be justified 
because it is not possible to determine whether the utilitarian reasons in 
favor of performing the conduct outweigh the deontological reasons 
against performing it. By the same token, if the military officials shot 
down the plane for the utilitarian reason of saving as many lives as possi- 
ble and the state prohibited that course of action for the deontological rea- 
son of respecting the principle that killing innocent human beings is 
wrong, it follows that the officials' conduct cannot be justified under my 
108. This theory of justification is based primarily on John Gardner's theory of justifi- 
cations as reasons. See, for example, John Gardner, Fletcher on Offences and Defences, 39 
Tulsa L. Rev. 817 (2004) [hereinafter Gardner, Offences]; John Gardner, Justifications and 
Reasons, in Harm and Culpability 103 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996) [here- 
inafter Gardner, Justifications]; Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in Criminal 
Law and Justice: Essays from the W.G. Hart Workshops, 1986 at 73 (I.H. Dennis ed., 
1987). His theory is based on Joseph Raz's theory of norms. See Joseph Raz, Practical 
Reason and Norms (1999). Whether the reasons to be taken into account are "objective" 
or "subjective," "guiding or "explanatory" is something better left for a future occasion. 
Sufice it to say that there is a fair amount of scholarly literature on this subject. See, e.g., 
Paul H. Robinson, ATheory of Justification: Societal Harm As a Prerequisite for Criminal 
Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266 (1975); George l? Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong 
Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 293 (1975). 
I want to make clear that Gardner justified an act only when the reasons infavor ofper- 
forming itprevail over the reasons against it. Cases where the reasons in favor merely offset the 
reasons against are not cases of justified conduct. This can be seen in Gardner, Justifications, 
supra, at 107; Gardner, Offences, supra, at 819. This is also consequent with Raz's discussion 
of exclusionary permissions. See Raz, supra, at 91. 
109. See Gardner, Justifications, supra note 108. 
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reasons theory of justification. Both of these cases have in common the 
fact that we are in equipoise because the conflicting reasons in favor of and 
against the conduct make it impossible for society to determine what is 
the right thing to do under the circumstances. 
C. Why the Doctor's and the Officials' Conduct Warrants 
a Normative Gap Defense under a Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing 
From the outset, my basic claim in this article was that both the con- 
joined twins case and the hypothetical of the officials shooting down a 
hijacked commercial plane heading for the Empire State Building 
proved that a finding of wrongfulness does not necessarily flow from an 
unjustified infraction of the paradigm of an offense. There is, so to speak, 
a gap to be bridged between an absence of justification and wrongdoing. 
This is what I call the normative gap thesis. What remained to be sorted 
out in the article was the search for a principle that could properly 
explain the normative gap between the lack of justification and wrong- 
doing. In other words, I had to find a principled way of explaining why 
we should regard the doctor's and the officials' conduct non-wrongful 
without justiQing it. I named the defense that would serve to do just 
this a normative gap defense. 
According to my reasons theory of wrongdoing an actor will be awarded 
a normative gap defense when it is impossible to determine whether the 
reasons in favor of performing the action outweigh the reasons the state 
has for prohibiting the action. In these cases the state has reasons 
for prohibiting the conduct while the actor has powerful reasons for per- 
forming it as well. Ultimately, the impossibility of determining which rea- 
sons should prevail negates the inference that the action was wrongful 
because, by recognizing the existence of commanding reasons both in 
favor and against performing the action, the state is left without suficient 
reasonsfor prohibiting the conduct. 
The impossibility of choosing among competing courses of action that 
are the product of different moral philosophies appears as a sufficient rea- 
son not to prohibit the conduct even though it does not provide an appro- 
priate foundation for justifying the act. 
The reasons theory of wrongdoing fills the normative gap between 
wrongfilness and absence of justification and, therefore, adequately solves 
both the doctor's and the officials' fact situations in the following manner: 
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(I) Conduct can only be wrongful if the state has sufficient reasons 
for prohibiting the conduct. 
(2) In both cases, the state's reason for prohibiting the conduct was 
based on the deontological principle that the killing of innocent 
life is morally wrong. 
(3) In both cases, the actor's reason for performing the prohibited 
conduct was based on the utilitarian principle that one should 
save as many lives as possible. 
(4) We are left in a state of equipoise because there are extremely 
powerful reasons both in favor of performing the conduct and 
against performing it. 
( 5 )  The doctor's and the officials' conduct are unjustified because it 
is not possible for society to determine whether their utilitarian 
reasons for performing the conduct outweigh the state's deonto- 
logical reasons for prohibiting the conduct. 
(6) The impossibility of determining which side is right is a suffi- 
cient reason for not punishing the conduct. This flows from the 
fact that punishing the conduct would be tantamount to enforc- 
ing a particular moral philosophy on society as a whole through 
the use of the criminal law (in these cases, a deontological moral- 
ity). This, in turn, is contrary to the reasons theory of wrongdo- 
ing and the Supreme Court's holdings in Casey and Lawrence. 
D. Summary of the Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing 
It is finally possible to give a rather complete account of the relationship 
between wrongdoing and reasons. The following table does just that: 
- ~ - 
Non- Wrongful Conduct 
-- 
Wrongful Conduct 
Conduct is not wrongful 
when the defendant is 
justified. 
Conduct is not wrongful 
when the reasons in 
favor of performing the 
conduct outweigh the 
reasons against 
performing it. 
Conduct is not wrongful when 
the defendant has a 
normative gap defense. 
Conduct is not wrongful when 
powerful reasons exist both 
in favor of performing the 
conduct and against doing 
so. Therefore, it is impossible 
to determine which course of 
action is the right thing to do. 
Conduct is wrongful 
because the state has 
sufficient reasons for 
prohibiting it. 
Conduct is wrongful 
when the reasons 
against performing the 
conduct outweigh the 
reasons in favor of 
performing it. 
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The solution to the conjoined twins case and the hijacked plane hypo- 
thetical is now more apparent than before. The proper solution is to 
acknowledge that both the doctor and the officials should be awarded a 
normative gap defense that negates the wrongfulness of their acts without 
justifying their conduct. The reasons theory of wrongdoing provides a 
vehicle for accomplishing this. Their conduct is not justified because it is 
not possible for society to determine whether the reasons they had for per- 
forming the conduct (abiding by the utilitarian principle of saving as 
many lives as possible) outweigh the reasons against performing the con- 
duct (abiding by the deontological principle of safeguarding the inviola- 
bility of human life). Consequently, if one accepts the thesis underlying 
this article, their conduct should be described as unjustified but not 
wrongful. The gap between an absence of justification and wrongdoing is 
finally bridged. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At the start of this article I posited the question of whether it could ever 
be lawful to kill an innocent human being. The short answer to the question 
is "yes." The long answer, however;has required me to delve deep into the 
nature of punishment and the essence of wrongdoing. 
Both the conjoined twins case and the hijacked plane hypothetical 
demonstrate that it is possible to negate the wrongfulness of an act without 
having to establish a valid claim of justification. I called this the norma- 
tive gap thesis. These cases show that an absence of justification does not 
necessarily entail a finding of wrongfulness. What was not entirely clear 
was how to account for this normative gap between the lack of justification 
and wrongdoing. 
I developed the reasons theory of wrongdoing as a way to bridge the 
gap between an unjustified infraction of an offense and wrongdoing. 
According to this theory, conduct is non-wrongful though unjustified 
when it is impossible to determine whether the reasons in favor of per- 
forming the conduct outweigh the reasons against it. This is precisely what 
happens in both cases. The doctor and the officials both have strong reasons 
based on a utilitarian morality in fivor of engaging in the conduct (saving 
as many lives as possible). On  the other hand, the state has strong reasons 
based on a deontological morality for prohibiting the conduct (respecting 
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the inviolability of innocent human life). It is clear that both of these con- 
flicting reasons for action are accepted as ethical and moral principles to 
which many people in society aspire and which thus determine the course 
of their lives. Therefore, in cases such as these, it is impossible for society 
to determine which side is right. This turns out to be a sufficient reason 
not to punish the conduct since, according to my reasons theory of 
wrongdoing, the people may not use the power of the state to enforce a 
particular moral point of view on society as a whole through operation of 
the criminal law. 
The reasons theory of wrongdoing provides a solution to both cases 
that conforms to our most basic moral intuitions. Furthermore, and most 
importantly, the reasons theor-  of wrongdoing solves both cases in an illu- 
minating manner that sheds light on notoriously obscure concepts such as 
punishment, wrongdoing, and justification. 
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